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This Article uses the recent prosecution of a sex trafficking case
in rural Missouri to argue three points. First, the federal law of
trafficking is currently being used in unanticipated ways, including
the apprehension of individuals who pay for sex. Second, trafficking
invites creative use precisely because it provides prosecutors with a
more salient justification for punishment than either legal moralism
or harm; a rhetorical plea to anti-slavery that enjoys a longstanding
but under-theorized role in criminal law rhetoric. Third, antislavery’s recurrence in criminal law rhetoric illustrates a larger
doctrinal point, namely that mid-century reformers like H. L. A. Hart
truncated John Stuart Mill to reduce the criminal sanction, ignoring
Mill’s subordination of harm to a larger, more intrusive “principle
of freedom.”
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Strange Traffic: Sex, Slavery, and the Freedom
Principle
ANDERS WALKER*
“The principle of freedom cannot require that [one] should be free
not to be free.”1
—John Stuart Mill
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 2009, paramedics in Lebanon, Missouri responded to
a call from an isolated trailer on a wooded hill, arriving to find a middleaged man named Ed Bagley administering CPR to a twenty-four year old
woman.2 According to Bagley, the woman—whom he referred to simply
as Nicole—had collapsed on the floor of their trailer just prior to leaving
for work.3 According to Nicole, who was later revived in a Springfield
hospital, Bagley had alternately shocked and suffocated her in a fit of
violent abuse, causing her to suffer cardiac arrest.4 The near-death
experience, Nicole later told federal authorities, marked the culmination of
a brutal relationship involving torture, terror, and confinement.5
Aghast, federal prosecutor Cynthia Cordes ordered agents to the trailer,
where they discovered a strange, white-walled room filled with chains,
handcuffs, piercing items, whips, and other sexual devices.6 Upon further
*
Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Yale University, Ph.D. 2003; Duke
University, J.D. 1998; Wesleyan University, B.A. 1994. I would like to thank Bernard Harcourt, Laura
Weinrib, Aziz Huq, R.H. Helmholz, Daniel Abebe, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Workshop at
the University of Chicago Law School, along with Bernadette Meyler, Annelise Riles, Josh Chafetz,
Aziz Rana, and the Law and Humanities Colloquium at Cornell Law School for comments and
criticism. I would also like to thank Laura Appleman, Norman Williams, David Friedman, Peter
Letsou, and the faculty workshop series at Willamette University College of Law for comments on this
piece, as well as Molly Walker Wilson, Monica Eppinger, Marcia McCormick, and the students in my
Regulation of Vice Seminar at Saint Louis University School of Law. Research credit goes to Nicholas
Burkhart, F. Phillip Peche, and Abby Duncan.
1
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 101 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978)
(1859).
2
Todd C. Frankel, Torture or Kinky Sex? Opinion Split, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 5,
2010, at A1.
3
Nicole’s last name was never revealed. Instead, the government referred to her simply as
Female Victim or “FV” in its indictment. Superseding Indictment at 5, United States v. Bagley,
No. 10-00244-01/02/04/06-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2011).
4
Frankel, supra note 2.
5
Id.
6
See id. (describing the scene discovered by FBI investigators).

564

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:561

questioning, Nicole revealed that Bagley had lured her into the trailer in
2002 with promises of a “great life,” meanwhile subjecting her to a pattern
of sadistic violence that spanned almost seven years and took the couple
from Missouri to Los Angeles for a pornographic photo shoot later sold to
Taboo magazine.7 Convinced that she had stumbled across a case of
modern slavery, Cordes charged Bagley with eighteen federal offenses,
including sex trafficking and violation of the Mann Act.8
This last allegation proved curious. Enacted in 1910, the Mann Act
emerged amidst a moral panic over white slavery that historians now
believe was exaggerated to facilitate a series of ulterior policy agendas,
including the regulation of immigrants and prostitutes.9 Recently, scholars
have begun to wonder whether similarly hidden motives might lie behind
federal trafficking prosecutions.10 To take just a few examples, sociologist
Gretchen Soderlund has demonstrated that federal interest in trafficking
derives in part from its utility as a tool of foreign policy, both as a
rhetorical cover for legitimating American intervention abroad and as a
device for directing United States Agency for International Development
funds to nations that comply with various American directives on sex
Meanwhile, domestic
education, contraceptives, and prostitution.11
reformers have embraced the rhetoric of trafficking to mount a larger,
veiled struggle against immigration, prostitution, and challenges to

7

Id.
Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 1–4.
9
See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International
Society, 44 INT’L ORG. 479, 513 (1990) (describing white slavery as “the entire system of licensed
prostitution in existence throughout much of Europe and parts of the United States”); see also DAVID J.
LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN ACT 38–41 (1994)
(discussing the history of the drafting of the Mann Act); Dianne Otto, Lost in Translation: Re-Scripting
the Sex Subjects of International Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 318,
324 (Anne Orford ed., 2006) (describing the trafficking of women for prostitution as the impetus of
white slavery). See generally Mary Ann Irwin, White Slavery as Metaphor: Anatomy of a Moral Panic,
5 EX POST FACTO 1 (1996) (explaining how an English newspaper article on white slavery sparked
controversy across the world).
10
See Alicia W. Peters, “Things That Involve Sex Are Just Different”: US Anti-Trafficking Law
and Policy on the Books, in Their Minds, and in Action, 86 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 235, 236 (2013)
(acknowledging a trend “to conflate prostitution with trafficking”); Gretchen Soderlund, Running from
the Rescuers: New U.S. Crusades Against Sex Trafficking and the Rhetoric of Abolition, 17 NWSA J.
64, 77 (2005) (“This case suggests that the tools anti-trafficking laws put at the administration’s
disposal can be used to further other geopolitical ends and are inseparable from the larger arena of
international politics.”).
11
Soderlund further contends that American interest in global sex trafficking spiked after
evangelical groups embraced the rescue and rehabilitation of foreign prostitutes as a means of
“proselytizing” them, even as President Bush invoked “nineteenth- and early twentieth-century antiprostitution rhetoric” to launch a “War Against Trafficking” that bolstered America’s “broader moral
agenda” in the War on Terror. Soderlund, supra note 10, at 77.
8
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“traditional social values rooted in heterosexual . . . marriage.”
Popular media have contributed to these efforts by publicizing extreme
cases, drawing dubious connections to antebellum slavery, and citing
questionable data.13 For example, the New York Times Magazine ran a
sensational story about domestic trafficking in 2004, alleging a “sextrafficking epidemic” in the United States that involved upwards of
“30,000 to 50,000 sex slaves” held in “squalid,” secret “stash houses,”
including one that evoked the “land-based equivalent of a 19th-century
slave ship.”14 Almost immediately, critics questioned the veracity of the
piece, citing a 2005 State Department report that boasted much lower
numbers than the New York Times Magazine alleged.15 Similarly, a 2008
study of teenage prostitutes conducted by sociologists Ric Curtis and Karen
Terry revealed that most of the youth were independently and voluntarily
prostituting to earn money, without fear of confinement or coercion.16 The
study concluded that claims of trafficked teenage prostitutes survived
precisely because reformers found it a useful frame for advancing ulterior
agendas—including counter-prostitution and immigration control—much
like the Mann Act in 1910.17
12
Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1665 (2010); see id. (discussing the link
between trafficking and anti-prostitution efforts); Nicholas D. Kristof, What About American Girls Sold
on the Streets?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at WK10 (demonstrating the prevalence of trafficking even
in the United States). One such agenda is the protection of illegal immigrants. Academics have
already begun to show how reclassifying undocumented immigrants as victims of trafficking enables
them to stay in the United States and avoid deportation. See, e.g., Britta S. Loftus, Coordinating U.S.
Law on Immigration and Human Trafficking: Lifting the Lamp to Victims, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 143, 146 (2011) (using a hypothetical to show that a police officer’s decision to arrest a foreign
woman for prostitution or, alternatively, to suspect the same woman to be a victim of human
trafficking, will impact whether the woman is deported or “protected”).
13
See generally Nicholas D. Kristof, The Face of Modern Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at
A31 (describing the author’s interview with a six-year-old Cambodian sex slave); Peter Landesman,
The Girls Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 30 (portraying the scene of a police
raid in New Jersey that rescued four underage Mexican sex slaves); Benjamin Skinner, Modern-Day
Slavery on D.C.’s Embassy Row?, TIME (June 14, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8
599,1996402,00.html (examining the case of a Tanzanian diplomat who forced a woman into slavery).
14
Landesman, supra note 13, at 32.
15
See
Jack
Shafer,
Sex
Slaves,
Revisited,
SLATE
(June
7,
2005),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2005/06/sex_slaves_revisited.html (citing a
2004 State Department report estimating that between 14,500 and 17,500 people were trafficked across
U.S. borders for forced labor and sexual exploitation); Editors’ Note, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, § 1, at
3 (responding to and addressing various critiques of Landesman’s article).
16
1 RIC CURTIS ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY 57–58 (2008); see also Kristen Hinman, Lost Boys,
VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.villagevoice.com/2011-11-02/news/lost-boys/ (reporting
on the research approach and findings of sociologists Ric Curtis and Meredith Dank).
17
See Hinman, supra note 16 (debunking the overwhelming media portrayal of child prostitution
in the United States as one where the child is controlled by a pimp). According to Gretchen Soderlund,
evangelicals have played a particularly important role in the resurgence of trafficking, seizing “on the
issue of sex slavery” to expressly “expand their base and political power.” Soderlund, supra note 10, at
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Ed Bagley’s initial prosecution for both the Mann Act violation and
sex trafficking provides a rare opportunity to assess the evolving power of
legal rhetoric over time, particularly the rhetoric of anti-slavery as a
justification for intrusive, regulatory regimes.18 To demonstrate, even
though Bagley’s Mann Act charge hinged on the claim that he transported
Nicole across state lines against her will, considerable evidence exists to
suggest otherwise. For example, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch sent a
reporter to Lebanon in 2010 only to find locals claiming that Nicole
boasted publicly of their sexual exploits, all part of a consensual S&M
lifestyle that she and Ed videotaped and posted on the Internet.19 One of
Nicole’s co-workers told the Post-Dispatch that Nicole considered her trip
to California a “blast,” a story corroborated by California-based
photographer Ken Marcus who had invited Ed and Nicole to Los Angeles
in 2007 for the supposedly criminal photo shoot.20 To Marcus, who
became aware of the couple by viewing one of their “live shows” online,
the pair seemed happy, Ed seemed doting, and Nicole appeared excited to
be on the West Coast.21 That Ed had coerced Nicole to go on the trip
struck Marcus as implausible, particularly since Nicole expressed an
interest in professional modeling—an interest she herself corroborated
during an interview with Taboo magazine in August 2007.22
Nicole’s stated willingness to serve as a pornographic model in
California raises questions about Ed Bagley’s trafficking and Mann Act
charges, questions further exacerbated by the outcome of the case. While
four defendants who traveled to Lebanon and participated in S&M sessions
with Nicole pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, and one
such defendant who also drove Ed and Nicole to California additionally
pleaded guilty to violating the Mann Act, Ed evaded all trafficking and
Mann Act charges and only pleaded guilty to the use of an interstate
facility, i.e., the Internet, to facilitate sex with a minor.23 This last charge
68. Finally, trafficking has proven a remarkably effective cover for the expansion of prosecutorial
might. Already, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Missouri has drawn
considerable federal funds by making itself one of the foremost hubs of human trafficking prosecutions
in the United States, even though it lies far from any international border or port. See Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Departments of Justice, Homeland Security and Labor Announce Selection of AntiTrafficking
Coordination
Teams
(July
25,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-crt-963.html (announcing a plan to bring a team of federal
prosecutors and federal agents to Kansas City, Missouri to combat human trafficking).
18
Chuang, supra note 12, at 1659.
19
Frankel, supra note 2.
20
Id.
21
Hunter Walker, FBI Questions Hustler Editor, Photographer in Sex Slave Case, WRAP (Sept.
12,
2010),
http://www.thewrap.com/media/column-post/alleged-sex-slave-appeared-hustlerphotoshoots-20766.
22
Ernest Greene, Master Ed and Slave Nicole: Heartland Kink, TABOO, Aug. 2007, at 53, 55.
23
Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Bagley, No. 10-00244-04-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Jan. 15,
2013); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Mo., Lebanon Man Pleads Guilty, Faces 20
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hinged on the fact that Ed allegedly began a sexual relationship with Nicole
when she was still sixteen, two years before Missouri’s age of consent and
four years before the other defendants met the couple.24
Though a separate charge exists for adults who traffic minors,25 the
U.S. Attorney ultimately opted not to invoke it in Bagley’s case.26 Taking
this bizarre charge arrangement—and the even more bizarre asymmetry in
convictions between Bagley and his co-defendants—as a starting point, this
Article will advance three main claims, addressed in three separate parts.
Part II will review the facts in the indictment, underscoring the
contradictions between the government’s initial charges, the defendants’
pleas, and known evidence in the case, suggesting that the law of
trafficking was used creatively to net defendants who paid for sex. Part III
will place Bagley’s conviction within the larger context of legal rhetoric,
showing how the rhetoric of anti-slavery has consistently been used to
impose heightened punishment, as evidenced by the White Slave Traffic
Act, or Mann Act, and trafficking—both of which were charged in the
case. Part IV will suggest that invocations of anti-slavery rhetoric bear
doctrinal implications, reconciling increased federal power with an undertheorized version of what John Stuart Mill termed the “principle of
freedom,” which is a basis for state power potentially more expansive and
complicated than H. L. A. Hart’s emphasis on harm.27
Years in Prison for Coercing a Minor to Become a Sex Slave (Jan. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/kansascity/press-releases/2013/lebanon-man-pleads-guilty-faces-20-years-inprison-for-coercing-a-minor-to-become-a-sex-slave.
24
MO. REV. STAT. § 567.030 (2012); Plea Agreement, supra note 23, at 2. Paying for sex
traditionally constitutes patronizing prostitution, a misdemeanor offense, and no U.S. attorney had ever
charged a patron of prostitution, or “John,” with conspiracy to traffic an adult. Press Release, supra
note 23.
25
18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).
26
Plea Agreement, supra note 23, at 1.
27
MILL, supra note 1, at 101. Mill uses the terms “freedom principle” and “liberty principle”
interchangeably. See John Gray & G.W. Smith, Introduction to J.S. MILL ON LIBERTY: IN FOCUS
1, 12–13 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991) (explaining the scope of the “liberty of action”
contemplated by Mill). Even John Stuart Mill qualified his famous harm principle in cases where
individuals willingly entered relationships that curtailed their freedom, a point that subsequent theorists
like H. L. A. Hart have missed. See H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 42–47 (1963)
(explaining the difficulty in applying Mill’s principles to the punishment of immoral or indecent
behavior); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
109, 176–77 (1999) (discussing new applications of the harm principle in the context of Chicago’s
temperance movement); John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY.
L.J. 1, 14 (2009) (relaying the differences between morality legislation based on harm and that based
on a “moral majority”); Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 132
(2007) (explaining how proponents of morality legislation bolster their arguments with legitimate
physical harm arguments). But see Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1151, 1151–52 (2010) (arguing that the recent interest in the legislation of morality is “greatly
exaggerated”). To those who maintain that the principles of harm and liberty merge, this Article
disagrees, arguing that prevailing notions of the harm principle are overly utilitarian, hopelessly vague,
and oft-eclipsed by rhetorical bids to rationalize the criminal sanction in the frame of anti-slavery.
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II. “EXTREME TYPES OF PLAY”
If ever a federal indictment aimed to shock the conscience, it was Ed
Bagley’s. Issued by a grand jury on March 29, 2011, the document
claimed that Ed and his wife Marilyn lured a sixteen-year-old girl named
Nicole, or “FV” (female victim), into their trailer with promises of “a great
life,” including, but not limited, to making her a “model,” making her a
“dancer,” and making her “dreams come true.”28 The Bagleys allegedly
provided FV with a “bedroom, dresser, and television,” along “with clothes
and food,” all in an effort “to entice her to stay in their trailer home.”29
From 2002 to 2004, when Nicole turned eighteen, the Bagleys “modeled
‘slave clothes,’” and “used the internet and adult BDSM pornography to
train and groom FV to become a sex slave.”30
Following Nicole’s eighteenth birthday, Ed subjected her to a series of
“sexual acts” that the government later framed as alternately “mutilation”
and “torture.”31 These included sessions during which Ed “hooded, roped
down, and pierced through FV’s nipples with hooks and stretched her
breasts in the air;” “whipped FV’s body” with “paddles, canes, and
floggers;” “gagged FV and tied her body and neck up with rope;” and
“locked, chained and hooded FV naked in a dog cage, often suspending the
cage in the air or attaching FV’s sex organs to electrical devices while she
was trapped in the cage.” 32
According to the indictment, Ed “advertised and publicized” these
activities “over the internet and in live web cam sessions.”33 One of the
websites that Ed posted to was alt.com.34 According to Michael Stokes,
one of Ed’s co-defendants who later pleaded guilty to trafficking, Ed
streamed so many videos on alt.com that he received a “free ‘gold
membership.’”35 Ed also staged live “demo” sessions with Nicole,
accepting cash and other items from men who paid to participate in the
sessions.36
Though the government framed Ed’s conduct as trafficking, i.e., the
use of force, fraud, or coercion to cause an individual to perform a
commercial sex act, Ed argued that he and Nicole were involved in a
28

Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 8.
Id.
30
Id.; see also United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d. 289, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (defining
BDSM as “an alternative sexual lifestyle, known as bondage, dominance/discipline, submission/sadism,
and masochism”).
31
Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 10.
32
Id. at 10–12.
33
Id. at 11–12.
34
Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Stokes, No. 10-00244-04-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Jan. 5,
2012).
35
Id.
36
Id.
29
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consensual, Dominant/submissive, or D/s relationship that hinged on
bondage, domination, and sadomasochism, or BDSM.37 Many of the
actions alleged in the indictment, Ed argued, boasted identifiable
corollaries in BDSM culture.38 For example, the use of metal devices to
pierce parts of the body is a common form of BDSM “play,” as is the use
of electricity or “electro-torture,” “bondage,” “erotic restraint,”
“suspension,” and the employment of various devices to whip or flog
another person.39 For serious BDSM practitioners, these activities assume
a distinctly “theatrical,” even “artistic” form, often requiring advanced
planning, preparation, and cooperation between the individual
administering the treatment, or the “Dominant,” and the individual
receiving the treatment, or the “submissive.”40
Rather than convey the planned, theatrical component of BDSM
practice, the government decontextualized Ed’s actions and portrayed them
as random acts of sadistic violence. Meanwhile the government stressed
the fact that Nicole was Ed’s “slave” as evidenced by the fact that Bagley
had her “sign a ‘sex slavery contract’” shortly after her eighteenth birthday
that bound her “legally” to him “with a term that ‘never’ ended.”41 Though
the contract bore no legal validity, the government framed Ed and Nicole’s
relationship in terms of modern slavery and trafficking.42
This warrants some comment. Recently popularized by romance
writer E.L. James in her 2012 best-seller Fifty Shades of Grey, the notion
of a D/s, or “slave,” contract first emerged in a nineteenth century novel by
German author Leopold von Sacher-Masoch.43 Entitled Venus in Furs, the
novel used the slave contract not to endorse chattel slavery but to
underscore a larger point about the relationship between intimacy and law,
arguing that true intimacy need not be rooted in notions of equality and that
liberal preoccupations with equality actually obviate the possibility of
achieving “the most intense human passion,” the highest form of love, and

37

Frankel, supra note 2.
Compare Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 9–12 (outlining the alleged conduct engaged
in with Nicole), with PHILIP MILLER & MOLLY DEVON, SCREW THE ROSES, SEND ME THE THORNS:
THE ROMANCE AND SEXUAL SORCERY OF SADOMASOCHISM 2–4 (1995) (discussing conduct and
practices commonly observed in BDSM relationships and culture).
39
See generally MILLER & DEVON, supra note 38, at 4–9, 78–79, 81, 95 (providing an overview
of BDSM tools and techniques used in “play”).
40
Danielle Lindemann, Will the Real Dominatrix Please Stand Up: Artistic Purity and
Professionalism in the S&M Dungeon, 25 SOC. F. 588, 593 (2010).
41
Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 9.
42
See Bill Draper, Edward Bagley, “Master Ed,” Pleads Guilty in Sex Slave Case, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/edward-bagley-sex-slaveguilty_n_2481981.html (quoting the rhetoric used by the government in the Ed Bagley case).
43
E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES OF GREY 165–75 (paperback ed. 2012); LEOPOLD VON SACHERMASOCH, VENUS IN FURS 73 (Joachim Neugroschel trans., Penguin Books 2000) (1870).
38
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44

the giving of oneself completely to another. In other words, the slave
contract in von Sacher-Masoch’s novel represented a legitimate, superior
alternative to both the marriage contract and to Locke’s social contract,
nothing less than the foundation for “a new social polity.”45 Precisely
because slave contracts mock both marriage and liberalism—they might be
viewed as a form of political or perhaps even artistic protest—critiques of
conventional values that coincide more closely with BDSM “play” than
with legal definitions of trafficking explain why they are a common trope
in D/s culture.46 Yet the government once again downplayed the existence
of such a culture in its indictment of Bagley, de-emphasizing the contextual
history of slave contracts in order to frame Nicole as a victim of sex
trafficking.
Arguably the most culturally freighted piece of evidence to be decontextually used against Bagley was a tattoo that Nicole received shortly
after her eighteenth birthday. According to Bagley’s indictment, Ed “had
FV tattooed to mark her as his property,” including “a bar code on FV’s
neck.”47 Rather than a sign of trafficking, however, the barcode’s origin
dates to Canadian artist Jana Sterback who used it as a critique of mass

44
VON SACHER-MASOCH, supra note 43, at 117–19; Nancy Bentley, The Strange Career of Love
and Slavery: Chesnutt, Engels, Masoch, 17 AM. LITERARY HIST. 460, 476–77 (2005).
45
Bentley, supra note 44, at 476–77. Though von Sacher-Masoch’s name would go on to inspire
the term masochism, nothing suggests that either Ed Bagley or “slave nicole,” as he referred to her on
D/s blogs and in Taboo magazine, were aware of Venus in Furs. Yet, the text underscores the point
that Bagley and Nicole’s relationship may in fact have been consensual, their contract an effort to
consecrate an intimate bond outside the confines of companionate marriage. Id. Indeed, if Bentley’s
read of von Sacher-Masoch is correct, then the slave contract may—for some—be even more
“intimate” than the marriage contract. Further, Nicole signed the contract when she was eighteen. By
that age, she was a consenting adult not just in the eyes of Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. § 566.034 (2012),
but also from the viewpoint of the federal government, 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012). See also ASAPH
GLOSSER ET AL., THE LEWIN GRP., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS (2004), available at http://www.hhs.gov/opa/pdfs/statutory-rape-state-laws.pdf
(compiling state laws and reporting requirements regarding statutory rape). A tangential question—not
addressed by the U.S. Attorney or, arguably, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act—is whether the
creation of a slave contract per se violates the Thirteenth Amendment. As President Barack Obama
stated in a presidential proclamation on December 29, 2011, “President Abraham Lincoln issued the
Emancipation Proclamation” not simply to end black slavery, but to consecrate the “essential
principles” of “equality and freedom,” throughout the nation. Proclamation 8772, 3 C.F.R. 213 (2011).
We live in a nation where, in the twenty-first century, “[t]he victims of modern slavery have many
faces.” Proclamation 8471, 3 C.F.R. 2 (2010). Hence, perhaps even those who enter willingly into
master/slave relationships violate the Constitution by effectively seceding from the Union. Imagine,
for example, if adherents to the S&M master/slave lifestyle chose not simply to build communities on
the Internet, but to create actual, physical communities. Does the invisibility and/or nongeographicality of Internet communities obscure what would otherwise be roundly condemned under
the Thirteenth Amendment?
46
See MILLER & DEVON, supra note 38, at 3 (suggesting that BDSM goes against generally
accepted social norms about love and sex).
47
Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 9.
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culture in a 1989 photograph of a faceless prisoner. Entitled Generic
Man, the photo sparked a trend in bar code tattoos in the United States and
abroad—with celebrities like Pink and Aubrey O’Day acquiring them.49 In
D/s culture, the barcode tattoo gained salience in 1999 thanks to a novel by
science fiction writer S.M. Stirling entitled The Domination.50
An alternate history, The Domination tells the story of a rogue group of
American colonists who remain loyal to the British following the American
Revolution, reject the new republic, and move their plantations and slaves
to Africa.51 Once there, they found a fictional colony called Drakia, which
tolerates slavery through the twentieth century, ultimately becoming a
major imperial power that defeats the United States in a global war.52 In
the book, slaves are acquired through conquest and given barcode numbers
as part of a larger process of being “groomed” into lives of service.53 The
book inspired the creation of the Master/slave Registry, an online service
formed in 2000 that enables Masters to register their slaves by number.54
Like Venus in Furs, The Domination posits an alternate social polity, a
world in which society functions more effectively when based on social
inequality, precisely because such inequality better suits human diversity.
Much like BDSM “play,” The Domination posits that some are better
suited by birth to be dominant, others submissive.55 Further, some actively
48
Tanos, Slave Register Website History, SLAVE REG., http://www.slaveregister.com/about/histor
y (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
49
Id. Rather than evidence that Ed coerced Nicole into her relationship with him, the tattoo might
explain why Nicole found the prospect of a relationship with Ed intriguing, possibly thinking it would
be cultural caché. In fact, one of Sterback’s other pieces, the meat dress, also gained popular notoriety
after Lady Gaga donned it at the 2010 MTV Video Music Awards. Christopher Knight, Lady Gaga,
Meat Jana Sterbak, L.A. TIMES CULTURE MONSTER (Sept. 13, 2010, 8:45 AM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/culturemonster/2010/09/lady-gaga-meat-dress-recycled.html. Here, we
see a blurring of lines between popular culture, counter-culture, and D/s subculture—again explaining
why a young person might be attracted to its exotic/extreme nature more than its constitutional or
criminal implications
50
See S.M. STIRLING, THE DOMINATION 39 (1999) (giving an example of the barcode tattoo).
51
Id. at 11–12.
52
Id. at 13–14.
53
Id. at 22, 35.
54
See Tanos, supra note 48 (evidencing The Domination’s impact on the Slave Register).
55
This raises the question whether consensual slavery violates the Thirteenth Amendment.
International law finds that slavery occurs whenever one party enjoys the exercise of “any or all of the
powers attach[ed] to the right of ownership” over another. Slavery Convention, art. 1, para. 1, Sept. 25,
1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253. “Equally,” notes Dr. Mohamad Mattar, “practices similar to slavery . . . such as
debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage, and sale of children are to be considered slavery-like
conditions only if they involve ‘the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching the right of ownership are exercised.’” Mohamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial
Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1247, 1258 (2011) (quoting Slavery Convention, supra, 60
L.N.T.S. at 263). Arguably more inclusive is the Thirteenth Amendment, which according to the
Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Nelson is “the denunciation of a condition, and not a
declaration in favor of a particular people.” 277 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2002). Additionally, as the
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seek out submissive roles for reasons that might not be obvious to casual
observers. For example, D/s circles registered a remarkable case of
consensual slavery in 1996 when a twenty-two year old woman named
Amanda posted a personal ad on alt.personals.bondage.com advertising
herself for sale.56 According to Amanda, she had auburn hair, was collegeeducated, and had been enjoying life “to its fullest” until she realized that
her parents—who worked for “large acquisition corporations”—made their
money by taking advantage of “less fortunate people,” foreclosing on
family-owned businesses to sell their “assets” and “mak[ing] huge
profits.”57 Claiming a desire to “atone for the sins of [her] family,”
Amanda offered herself for sale online to the highest bidder “as a sex
slave” willing to “do and perform any perverse degrading and
dehumanizing rituals” that her master desired, with the only requirement
being that her owner “video tape one session a month to be sent to [her]
parents” so they would know what her life had become.58 Two months
later, the winner of Amanda’s auction—identified simply as “Master
Mark”—posted a message to the same blog, noting that “placing a
monetary value to a slave exchange ensures that the submissive receives
the best chance of being secured by a dominant who will appreciate,
respect, and develop the slave’s gift of submission.”59 Here, the transfer of
money not only added value to the master/slave experience, but guaranteed
some base-level treatment of the slave, even though the slave herself
authorized the performance of “perverse degrading and dehumanizing
rituals” upon her.60
While Master Ed did not pay money for “slave nicole,” he did
allegedly accept money from other men for activities involving Nicole.
For example, four named defendants—Bradley Cook, Dennis Henry,
James Noel, and Michael Stokes—all provided Ed with cash and other
items so that they could “engage in sexual acts and torture sessions” with
FV.61 Ed referred to such transactions as “whoring out” Nicole, a practice
that enjoys some currency in D/s circles.62 While “whoring out” a
Ninth Circuit put it in United States v. Mussry, the Thirteenth Amendment applies “to a variety of
circumstances and conditions . . . [and] to contemporary as well as historic forms of involuntary
servitude.” 726 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1984).
56
Baboox, Young Female Slave for Sale, BONDAGE (Dec. 12, 1996, 2:00 AM),
http://www.alt.personals.bondage.com (password protected website, record on file with author).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Master Mark, Comment to Slaves Selling Themselves, BONDAGE (Feb. 8, 1997, 2:00 AM),
http://www.alt.personals.bondage.com (password protected website, record on file with author).
60
Young Female Slave for Sale, supra note 56.
61
Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 7.
62
See, e.g., Being Pimped/Whored Out, SLAVEFARM.COM (July 7, 2007, 3:46 PM),
http://www.slavefarm.com/blog/fist-slut/being-pimpedwhored-out (discussing the practice of being
“whored out”).
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submissive could theoretically qualify as prostitution, the U.S. Attorney in
Bagley’s case opted instead to charge all four individuals with conspiracy
to traffic, an offense to which all four—but not Bagley—later confessed.63
To be convicted of conspiracy to traffic, the federal government need
only prove that the defendants agreed to affect interstate commerce by
causing the victim to “engage in a commercial sex act” either knowing that
“force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion” were necessary to do so, or
being “in reckless disregard of the fact.”64 According to the statute, a
commercial sex act comprises “any sex act on account of which anything
of value is given to or received by any person.”65 Meanwhile, coercion
requires “threats of serious harm,” “physical restraint,” or any type of
scheme or plan “intended to cause a person to believe” that if she does not
perform an act then she will be subjected to “serious harm” or “physical
restraint.”66
While Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes all pleaded guilty to the charge
of conspiracy,67 questions remain as to why, precisely, Bagley did not.68
Further, questions remain as to why the government did not pursue Bagley
on this point, pushing him to trial. For example, the exchange of cash in
return for access to Nicole should theoretically have established a
conspiratorial agreement between Bagley and the others. Meanwhile, both
Cook and Stokes gave Bagley money to transport Nicole by car from
Missouri to California for a pornographic photo shoot, thereby affecting
interstate commerce.69
On the topic of the photo shoot, one of the co-defendants charged with
conspiracy, Henry, also pleaded guilty to violating the Mann Act for
driving Bagley and Nicole at least part of the way from Missouri to
California.70 Here again though, questions remain as to why Bagley
63
Plea Agreement, supra note 34, at 1; Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Cook, No. 1000244-02-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2011); Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Henry, No. 1000244-03-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Mar. 24, 2011); Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Noel, No. 1000244-05-CR-W-DW (W.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2011).
64
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012); see also id. § 371 (describing the maximum punishment for
conspiracy).
65
Id. § 1591(e)(3).
66
Id. § 1591(e)(2).
67
See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Mo., Lebanon Man Pleads Guilty to Sex
Trafficking, Admits Torturing Woman Who Was Coerced as Sex Slave (Jan. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2012/stokes.ple.html (describing the progression of guilty pleas
from Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes on their charges of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force,
fraud, or coercion).
68
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
69
Another possible impact on interstate commerce might have been communications between
Bagley, Cook, Noel, and Stokes via email, using an instrument of interstate commerce: the Internet.
70
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. Mo., Former Nevada Postmaster Pleads Guilty
to Sex Trafficking Conspiracy, Admits Torturing Woman Coerced as Sex Slave (Mar. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/kansascity/press-releases/2011/kc032411.htm.
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escaped conviction. After all, the Mann Act requires that the government
prove a defendant transported a victim across state lines for the purpose of
an illegal sex act, in this case trafficking.71 Presumably, Henry confessed
to knowing that Nicole would be trafficked—meaning that she would be
coerced into performing a commercial sex act.72 However, Bagley refused
to plead and the government refrained from trying him.73 Why?
One reason might be that Nicole was never actually coerced. Shortly
after returning from California, Nicole declared in an interview with Taboo
editor Ernest Greene that “Master Ed” was a “great, loving, outgoing guy,”
and that she had a “fun-loving relationship” with him.74 Noting that the
couple had come to the magazine’s attention by way of photographer Ken
Marcus, Greene proceeded to inquire into the details of Ed and Nicole’s
relationship, including how they met.75 According to Nicole, she “didn’t
know anything about BDSM” before meeting Bagley, but thought he was
“good-looking and seemed kind of on the wild side.”76 Bagley, by
contrast, remembered meeting Nicole through some friends, commenting
on how she “bounced out of the car, wearing shorts and a skimpy little
top,” immediately convincing him that “she was the slave girl for me.”77
Shortly thereafter, Nicole moved in with the Bagleys and, as she told
Taboo, fell “in love with” Ed and Marilyn and decided to “stay[] with them
and lov[e] them for the rest of [her] life.”78 Rather than portray herself as a
victim, in other words, Nicole described her relationship with Ed and
Marilyn as a voluntary arrangement, on par with a marital relationship—a
haunting affirmation of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s theory that slavery
could in fact coincide with love.
Ed provided further insight into the dynamics of their D/s “play”
sessions during the Taboo interview. Rather than aimed at hurting Nicole,
Ed explained to Taboo that their activities resembled an evolving series of
theatrical performances, each one more radical than the last, but all
71

Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012).
Pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, an adult is trafficked if she is made
to participate in a commercial sex act by “force, fraud, and coercion.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (2012).
If she consensually agrees to a commercial sex act, say sex in exchange for cash, then she is technically
not trafficked. While Nicole might be guilty of prostitution, it is actually in her best interest to allege
that she was trafficked, for then she escapes criminal liability—a point worth noting given that the U.S.
Attorney identified Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes as “customers” and “Johns.” Press Release, U.S.
Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Mo., Three More Defendants Sentenced in Sadomasochistic Sex
Trafficking Conspiracy (Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2013/stok
es.sen.html.
73
Draper, supra note 42.
74
Greene, supra note 22, at 53.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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consensual. For example, he explained that he “had to learn a lot” in
order to “keep things fresh” with Nicole, including new “extreme types of
play” like “catheter insertion, chastity sewing,” and “nailing [Nicole] to a
board,” all activities later listed in the criminal indictment against him.80
Nicole spoke articulately about these actions and others, including
“hanging upside down,” “being hog-tied,” and wearing “hoods for the
suspense of wondering which whip or what toy [she would] get next,”
including “gags to bite down when [she felt] the need to cry or scream.”81
Though some degree of discomfort or pain seemed to be involved in almost
every action they described, Nicole also confessed that she had a “safe
word,” but did not like using it unless necessary.82
One way to explain Nicole’s interview with Taboo is that she enjoyed
their sessions, loved Ed, and was not trafficked to California. Another
possible explanation is that Bagley somehow coerced her into saying the
things she did. For example, Nicole might genuinely have been afraid that
Bagley would hurt her if she did not pretend to condone their relationship,
deciding instead to mask her fear in statements of enthusiasm. Of course,
this begs the larger question: Why, over the course of the seven years that
Nicole lived with Bagley, did she not try to escape, either by alerting
neighbors, or physically absconding and contacting police? Such questions
lend themselves either to Bagley’s innocence or to the possibility that just
like many victims of domestic violence, Nicole developed what Dee
Graham and Del Martin have called “traumatic bonding,” a condition
where victims of domestic abuse develop an inability to leave or resist.83
Yet, the state occluded any mention of such conditions, focusing instead on
evidence suggesting that Bagley engaged in “sexual torture activities” for
the sole purpose of harming Nicole.84 Even if Bagley was a sadistic
psychopath, for example, Nicole could not be counted a victim of
79

Id.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 80 (1976) (“[A] battered woman may spend more energy
in keeping her secret and trying to salvage some self-respect than in trying to extricate herself from the
trap.”); Dee L. Graham et al., Survivors of Terror: Battered Women, Hostages and the Stockholm
Syndrome, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 217, 220–21 (Kersti Yllö & Michele Bograd
eds., 1988) (defining “[t]raumatic bonding” as “strong emotional ties that develop between two people
in a relationship where one person intermittently abuses and/or threatens the other” (emphasis
omitted)); see also Alfred DeMaris & Steven Swinford, Female Victims of Spousal Violence: Factors
Influencing Their Level of Fearfulness, 45 FAM. REL. 98, 98 (1996) (reiterating the strong emotional
attachment women may experience with their batterers). In such situations, individuals in Nicole’s
position may develop a “learned helplessness” that leads them to view their attacker as invincible and
themselves as incapable of taking any action against him. Robert Geffner & Mildred Daley Pagelow,
Victims of Spouse Abuse, in TREATMENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 113, 116 (Robert T.
Ammerman & Michel Hersen eds., 1990).
84
Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 6.
80

576

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:561

trafficking if she consented to their trips, “live webcam shows,” and “play”
sessions, no matter how shocking they may have been to the uninitiated
observer.85
Such observers refused to believe that Ed had trafficked Nicole. For
example, Lebanon local Lorrie Bredvick, a waitress at a local restaurant,
explained to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that Ed and Nicole frequented her
restaurant often and would always sit at a table in the back corner.86
According to Bredvick, Nicole was very outgoing and openly spoke about
her hard-core photo shoots and sexual activities.87 Bredvick said “[t]hey
no more held that woman captive than a man on the moon,”88 a story
corroborated by others in the area, including Kelly Myers, a twenty-five
year old dancer who worked with Nicole at the After Dark Gentlemen’s
Club near Fort Leonard Wood.89 According to Myers, stripping was
Nicole’s “passion” and she took it very “[s]eriously.”90 Myers also
claimed that Nicole had not been taken to California against her will, but
rather that she “said she had a blast,” raved about “[h]ow nice California
is,” and encouraged Myers “to go out there.”91
Witnesses in California confirmed Myers’s version of events; among
them was Ken Marcus, a longtime photographer for Playboy and
Penthouse who worked with Nicole in Los Angeles.92 Upon questioning,
Marcus claimed that he had invited Ed and Nicole to Los Angeles after
viewing one of their “live webcam shows” on alt.com.93 Marcus then
conducted a series of shoots with Nicole and Anastasia Price, a
professional S&M model, “over a period of several days,” selling some of
the photographs to Taboo magazine—a Larry Flynt publication dedicated
to BDSM pornography—and reserving others for view on his personal
site.94 Marcus also conducted an interview with Ed and Nicole during
which she confessed that she had not been to Los Angeles before but
“hope[d]” to return.95 As Marcus explained it, Ed and Nicole “seemed to
be quite a lovely couple,” and Ed appeared to be “going out of his way to
make sure she was as happy as possible.”96 Shocked to hear that Bagley
had been arrested for trafficking, Marcus asserted that he witnessed no
85

Walker, supra note 21.
Frankel, supra note 2.
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signs that Nicole was “forced, coerced, or mentally disabled.” Instead, he
claimed that she appeared “bright, intelligent and in control.”98
While it is certainly possible that Marcus, Myers, and Bredvick all
misread the nature of Ed and Nicole’s relationship, Nicole herself endorsed
that relationship during her 2007 Taboo interview, conducted shortly after
their return from Los Angeles.99 That Nicole might have lied is possible,
particularly if she suffered from a condition akin to traumatic bonding.
However, even the successful demonstration of such a condition may not
have been sufficient to convict Ed of trafficking, particularly if he
remained oblivious to Nicole’s quiet non-consent. For example, Ed
seemed to think that Nicole went willingly to California, minimizing the
likelihood of proving the requisite mens rea that he either knowingly or
recklessly coerced her, as required by the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (“TVPA”).100 Moreover, Bagley posted on SlaveFarm.com that “slave
nicole loved” the California experience and enjoyed “reading all the
comments” online about the shoot.101 Though this too might have been a
subterfuge, the combined effect of his online comments, Nicole’s tabloid
interview, and eyewitness accounts in both Missouri and California all help
to explain why the government ultimately discarded Bagley’s trafficking
charge; a point underscored by his surprisingly mild plea deal. Though far
more involved with Nicole than any of the other defendants who did plead
guilty to conspiracy to traffic, Bagley escaped with a non-trafficking
related charge: the federal version of statutory rape.102 The convictions of
Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes, on the other hand, demonstrate how the
law of trafficking is being used in creative ways, in this case to prosecute
defendants who paid for what they believed was consensual sex. How this
happened, as a rhetorical matter, is the subject of the next Part. It will
argue that the government’s case against Ed Bagley points to an undertheorized rhetorical frame for amplifying the criminal sanction, neither
97

Id.
Id. Given that the government’s Mann Act charge hinged on illegal activity in California—
including allegations that Bagley coerced Nicole into the trip—Marcus’s public statements cast Ed’s
alleged use of coercion into doubt, at least in relation to the California trip. For example, shortly after
photographs from Nicole’s shoot were published in Taboo, Bagley himself posted on SlaveFarm.com
that the trip “made her want to try even harded [sic] to be a good slave girl.” Master Ed, Comment to
Hustler
Taboo
Magazine,
SLAVEFARM.COM
(June
23,
2007,
6:07
PM),
www.slavefarm.com/forum/general/general-discussions/hustler-taboo-magazine. Had Bagley known
that he was facing a potential Mann Act charge, would he have blogged publicly about the trip? Or,
conversely, was the act of blogging about the trip a deliberate effort to mask the fact that Nicole had
indeed been trafficked? Ken Marcus would seemingly have answered the second question in the
negative, as would Kelly Myers, the dancer in Fort Leonard Wood who told the Post-Dispatch that
upon her return, Nicole claimed that her trip to California had been “a blast.” Frankel, supra note 2.
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legal moralism nor harm, but liberty.
III. THE RHETORIC OF SLAVERY
Given the decontextualized nature of the charges against Bagley,
trafficking appears to be an odd fit in his case. Yet, it is precisely this ill-fit
that makes the case curious, raising the question of whether there are
underlying cultural or rhetorical considerations at work—aspects of
trafficking that make it an attractive prosecutorial device despite doctrinal
incongruities. For example, federal interest in prosecuting Bagley might be
related to the relatively straightforward question of resources.103 Following
the federal government’s enactment of the TVPA in 2000, the Bureau of
Justice Assistance sponsored forty-two Human Trafficking Task Forces in
the United States, including one in the Western District of Missouri, which
subsequently received federal grants of nearly one million dollars expressly
to pursue trafficking cases.104 Flush with federal funds but far from an
international border or port, U.S. Attorneys in the Western District
subsequently employed a variety of creative techniques to net trafficking
convictions. Some of these techniques included merging the TVPA with
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),
prosecuting traffickers who advertised trafficking victims online,
prosecuting parents for trafficking their children, and, in the Bagley case,
prosecuting “customers” or “Johns” who exchanged money for sex under a
conspiracy theory.105
This last charge warrants comment. Even if the Western District’s
decision to pursue Bagley bore some relation to resources, it still embodied
a unique rhetorical move, an effort to apply the prevailing frame of
trafficking to the more traditional trope of prostitution. For instance, the
designation of defendants Cook, Noel, and Stokes as “Johns” in the
indictment clearly evoked the frame of prostitution, suggesting they were

103
If Nicole had clearly been forced to commit commercial sex acts, either by suffering physical
detention or threats of deportation, as befalls many undocumented sex workers, then the trafficking
charge would warrant little comment. Not so here. Conflicting witness testimony, counter-cultural
practices unique to BDSM, and the smorgasbord of resulting convictions invites speculation as to the
government’s insistence on trafficking. This furthers the critique that the federal government has failed
in the war to stop slave trafficking. KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR:
HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY IN AMERICA TODAY 248–50 (2009).
104
Mark J. Kappelhoff, Federal Prosecutions of Human Trafficking Cases: Striking a Blow
Against Modern Day Slavery, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 9, 17 (2008); Abby Duncan, A Tale of Two
Districts: Lessons Learned from Missouri’s Human Trafficking Task Forces 1–2 (Jan. 18, 2013)
(unpublished paper, Saint Louis University School of Law) (on file with author).
105
Human Trafficking Rescue Project, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., W. DISTRICT MO.,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/programs/humantrafficking.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); see
Duncan, supra note 104, at 24–26 (describing prosecution tactics in the Bagley case).
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little more than men who paid Nicole for her sexual services. Assuming
Nicole consented to such activity, the most they could be charged with
pursuant to Missouri state law would be patronizing prostitution, a
misdemeanor.107 Under a trafficking framework, however, Cook, Noel,
and Stokes faced a much greater penalty, upwards of twenty years in
federal prison.108
That Stokes and the other “Johns” pleaded guilty to trafficking—but
Ed Bagley did not—only underscores the creative prosecution of the case.
It suggests, for example, that the array of charges against Bagley was not in
fact as noteworthy as the creative application of conspiracy to net
peripheral actors. This, in turn, bolsters arguments made by scholars of
trafficking discourse like Gretchen Soderlund, Karen Terry, and Ric Curtis,
all of whom contend that the rhetoric of trafficking tends to be invoked in
cases where it does not actually apply.109 One such expert particularly
relevant to Bagley’s case is Janie Chuang.110 Beginning in the 1990s,
argues Chuang, “an unusual alliance of feminists, neo-conservatives, and
evangelical Christians” pushed for the abolition of prostitution through the
rubric of trafficking.111 Such “neo-abolitionists” refused to accept that
women might willingly choose to become prostitutes, arguing instead that
they suffered from “false consciousness” and were best understood as
victims of a form of modern slavery that warranted abolition.112 The
rhetoric of abolition and slavery, in turn, enabled such “neo-abolitionists”
to stir bipartisan support for aggressive implementation of anti-trafficking
laws, precisely the kind of aggressive measures that have since come to
characterize Missouri’s Western District.113
Though public interest in trafficking has spiked since the 1990s, the
political salience of anti-slavery rhetoric dates back to the nineteenth
century.114 As the remainder of this Part shall demonstrate, the rhetoric of
anti-slavery has long energized anti-prostitution campaigns, beginning as
106
See MO. REV. STAT. §567.030 (2012) (noting that a person who hires a prostitute commits a
misdemeanor).
107
Id.
108
Bradley Stokes pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic and received a twenty-year sentence.
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Mo., Kirkwood Man Pleads Guilty to Sex
Trafficking (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://justice.gov/usao/mow/news2011/cook.ple.html.
109
See Soderlund, supra note 10, at 65 (explaining that anti-trafficking movements throughout
history have drawn on the rhetoric of abolition to underscore the urgency of their cause); see also
CURTIS ET AL., supra note 16, at 9–10 (explaining that most youth in their survey were not trafficked).
110
Nicole’s role in the case is markedly different depending on whether she is viewed through the
lens of trafficking or prostitution. While Nicole might be guilty of prostitution, she could escape
criminal liability if she if alleges that she was trafficked.
111
Chuang, supra note 12, at 1664.
112
Id. at 1664–66.
113
Id. at 1659.
114
BALES & SOODALTER, supra note 103, at 6.
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early as the 1880s.
Recovering this history is important, if for no other
reason than to underscore the manner in which anti-slavery rhetoric has
traditionally operated as a counterpoint to the more staid rhetorical
conventions of legal moralism and harm. For example, most criminal law
scholars generally agree that moralism entered a decline in the latter half of
the twentieth century, leading to what criminal law theorist Bernard
Harcourt has termed a “cacophony of competing harm arguments without
any way to resolve them.”116 The likely outcome of this cacophony, argues
Harcourt, is that at some point “[a]nother structure will surely emerge,”
perhaps even increasing our “appreciation that there is harm in most human
activities.”117
Even a brief look at the history of legal rhetoric in the criminal law
context suggests that another structure has emerged—or rather has been
latent in criminal law rhetoric for over a century. As early as the 1880s, for
example, reformers began to invoke the rhetoric of slavery to regulate
prostitution, culminating in the passage of the White Slave Traffic Act, or
Mann Act, in 1910.118 Born midst fear that growing numbers of women
were being lured into prostitution, the Mann Act remains one of the singlemost controversial pieces of legislation in American history.119 Historians
generally agree that the stated reasons for the law—a fear that single
women were being kidnapped and exploited as slaves—lacked substantial
evidentiary basis.120 Instead, the legislation became a rhetorical method for
advancing a host of ulterior agendas, including immigration control and the
abolition of prostitution.121 Precisely because it lent itself to such
politicized uses, the Mann Act might be described as an early sanction
invoking the rhetoric of slavery to criminalize “illicit” behavior—in short,
an early version of the same sexual project that is being used to target Ed
Bagley, who was also charged with violating the Act.122
115

Nadelmann, supra note 9, at 513–14.
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LANGUM, supra note 9, at 4.
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See id. at 4 (“[I]n enacting the Mann Act, Congress aimed at a very specific problem.
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See Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J.
756, 790 (2006) (“[L]awmakers linked Mann’s bill to the 1907 Immigration Act as enacting a single,
common project . . . .”); Loftus, supra note 12, at 143–44 (arguing that human trafficking laws often
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between 1948 and 1986. As currently written, the statute punishes individuals who transport others
across state lines for illegal sex, or in Bagley’s case, trafficking. However, trafficking itself requires
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While Harcourt is certainly correct that conservatives endorsed harm
arguments in the 1990s, a brief look at the climate that produced the Mann
Act indicates that the current cacophony in criminal law rhetoric is not
new. Reformers like Anthony Comstock began to enlist harm arguments in
the regulation of illicit sex as early as 1872, not long after Mill finished On
Liberty.123 According to historian Nicola Beisel, the “overwhelming
majority” of Comstock’s reasons for attacking pornography in the 1870s
“concern[ed] its effects on children,” including the harm that it caused
them both morally and physically.124 Among the physical effects that
Comstock focused on was pornography’s tendency to encourage the “fatal
habit of masturbation,” a physical and psychological “debility.”125
Driving Comstock’s invocation of harm was a concern over collapsing
morals, particularly regarding pornography and prostitution, the latter of
which was not only tolerated in most cities but also legalized in some,
including St. Louis in 1870.126 As historian Paul Boyer notes, St. Louis’s
decision to legalize prostitution set off “alarm bells” in “moral-reform
circles all over the country.”127 However, such bells did not simply stir
morality-based arguments; they also roused the rhetoric of harm. For
example, nineteenth century reformers argued that prostitution threatened
not simply moral decline, but also safety, as “debauched husbands”
brought syphilis home to their unsuspecting wives.128 Consternation over
prostitution’s role in spreading venereal disease to innocents spawned a
“social hygiene movement” that then merged with a more moralist “Purity
Movement” to suppress prostitution completely.129 As historian David
Langum notes, cities across America suddenly “began to discover they had
vice problems” and formed vice commissions to investigate segregated red
light districts, ultimately leading to their abolition.130
Anti-vice crusades provide convincing evidence of how moral
arguments and harm arguments merged in the nineteenth century,
coercion, and that element that cannot be satisfied if the victim acquiesced to the sexual conduct in
question. Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2423 (2012); see also Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(3)(A) (2012) (defining coercion as “threats of serious harm to
or physical restraint against any person”); LANGUM, supra note 9, at 153 (stating that if a woman
followed a man across state lines, at neither the man’s request nor expense, and then resumed a sexual
relationship, the Mann Act would not be violated).
123
See NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY
REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 76 (1997) (discussing how Comstock linked his anti-vice
movement to changes in the social order that affected and harmed the foundation of the Victorian
family).
124
Id. at 53.
125
Id. at 54–55.
126
PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820–1920, at 143 (1978).
127
Id.
128
BEISEL, supra note 123, at 22.
129
LANGUM, supra note 9, at 22–23.
130
Id. at 25.
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engendering a cacophony not entirely unlike that which Harcourt describes
today. For example, historian Nicola Beisel notes that “[t]he anti-vice
crusade[s]” of the nineteenth century “gained legitimacy from the claim
that children were threatened by the vices reformers sought to suppress.”131
These included prostitution, pornography, and extra-marital sex—a
problem facilitated by easily available contraceptives and abortions.132
Reformers like Anthony Comstock targeted such issues, pushing states to
criminalize the transfer of obscenity in the mail, the distribution of
contraceptives, and the performing of abortions—the latter of which “had
been legal in virtually all of the states until the 1850s.”133 Such issues,
argues Beisel, including dangers of “pornography” and “the corruption of
children by libidinous and pervasive popular culture,” prefigured
“contemporary political concerns.”134
Animating the rise of harm arguments in the nineteenth century was a
sense on the part of some reformers that morality alone did not sufficiently
justify why certain behaviors needed to be controlled. For example, many
proponents of the charity organization movement “rejected” the “churchrelated approaches” prevalent earlier in the nineteenth century, partly for
fear that churches might opt not to root out vice so much as to use it as a
shaming device for boosting church attendance.135 Of particular concern in
this regard was the Catholic Church, an institution popular among urban
immigrants yet reviled by Protestant reformers who suspected it of
tolerating vice as an ineradicable “sin” and therefore an “inevitable” part of
life.136 Sectarianism, in other words, fueled the turn away from moral
arguments and toward the harm principle.
Yet, harm arguments were themselves disputed at the close of the
nineteenth century. For example, radical reformers like Victoria Woodhull
and Tennessee Claflin both argued that behind Comstock’s anti-vice
crusade lay a more sinister campaign to subordinate women, partly by
subjecting them to the male-dominated institution of marriage.137
Proponents of extra-marital sex, or “free love” as it was called at the time,
joined Woodhull, Claflin, and other radicals like Ezra Heywood, who
argued for the abolition of marriage on account that it “enslaved” women

131

BEISEL, supra note 123, at 4.
See id. (discussing how crusades against prostitution, pornography, abortion, and
contraceptives were strengthened by the claim that these vices harmed children).
133
Id. at 8–9, 25.
134
Id. at 4.
135
BEISEL, supra note 123, at 148–49.
136
LANGUM, supra note 9, at 210; see also BOYER, supra note 126, at 133 (stating that Protestant
churchmen saw the decline in urban Protestantism and increase in Roman Catholicism as contributing
to the moral decline of the city).
137
BEISEL, supra note 123, at 79–80.
132
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and “demeaned” the very notion of love itself.
By invoking the trope of slavery, Heywood and others countered
Comstock’s arguments about immorality—and harm—as it pertained to
extra-marital sex, effectively subsuming both legal moralism and the harm
principle within the larger rubric of promoting liberty.139 This emphasis on
liberty provided just the type of alternate rhetorical structure to the
morality/harm debate that we see in trafficking today—only it emerged a
century ago. As historian Paul Boyer puts it, “In the more lurid rhetorical
flights of the antivice crusaders, to become a prostitute was to enter a life
of ‘white slavery.’”140 Meanwhile, “from the perspective of many of the
women themselves . . . the decision represented a liberating escape from
bondage,” or matrimony.141
At a time when African Americans were still considered inferior to
whites, the invocation of white slavery proved a particularly powerful
rhetorical trope aimed at mobilizing reform.142 For example, post-bellum
American labor leaders regularly identified America’s industrial working
class as white slaves, railing against industrial employers for treating their
employees like chattel.143 As popular labor leader Eugene Debs put it in
1897, “the African slave” was a “prince” compared to white “workmen,”
who were not valued at “15 cents a cord by the slavholders [sic] of
today.”144
Just as labor leaders employed the rhetoric of white slavery to sanction
reform at the turn of the twentieth century, so too did social reformers
argue that similar dangers threatened white working-class women.145
Beginning in the 1880s, for example, reformers in Chicago began to fear
that “shop-girls, cigaretmakers [sic], and sewing girls” risked exploitation
at the hands of unscrupulous employers who kept wages so low that
women had no choice but to compromise their virtue to survive.146 Such
138

Id. at 76, 87.
Id. at 87–88.
140
BOYER, supra note 126, at 204.
141
Id.
142
See Helga Kristin Hallgrimsdottir & Cecilia Benoit, From Wage Slaves to Wage Workers:
Cultural Opportunity Structures and the Evolution of the Wage Demands of the Knights of Labor and
the American Federation of Labor, 1880–1900, 85 SOC. FORCES 1393, 1402 (2007) (discussing how
the labor movement used the term white slavery to mobilize indentured laborers to fight against wage
slavery).
143
See id. (“In postbellum America, references to wage slavery drew on both the historical
memory of slavery and indenture as well as on a racialized meaning in which color was brought in to
overlay and heighten critiques of work conditions for white workers.”).
144
Debs Army Quits Work, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 22, 1897, at 7.
145
See, e.g., An Infamous Traffic, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 8, 1885, at 1 (juxtaposing London’s
“white slave trade” against the experience of Chicago’s young, vulnerable working women); “White
Slaves,” CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 19, 1881, at 8 (offering a cautionary description of human trafficking
operations that existed between London and the European continent).
146
An Infamous Traffic, supra note 145.
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fears escalated in the 1890s, fueled by sensational stories like H.H.
Holmes’s serial killing of women in Chicago during the 1893 World’s
Fair.147 Lurid accounts of immigrant women trafficked into slavery
followed, further intensifying calls for legal reform.148 By the close of
1907, Chicago journalist George Kibbe Turner completed his torrid exposé
of prostitution dens run by depraved men who preyed on hapless, Jewish,
immigrant women.149 Countless white slavery narratives followed,
ultimately leading Illinois Congressman James Mann to sponsor the White
Slave Traffic Act, or Mann Act, in 1910.150
While scholars of the Mann Act have focused heavily on its race and
gender implications, few have underscored the law’s significance to the
legal rhetoric of criminal law, particularly its use of slavery to counter
and/or accentuate claims rooted in legal moralism and harm.151 For
example, reformers began to reframe prostitution as white slavery at the
turn of the century partly to override the question of whether single women
who engaged in extra-marital sex might have done so willingly, for their
own pleasure.152 Such “charity girls” suffered criticism for going “out with
men for an evening of pleasure and drink and intercourse where no money
[was] asked or offered.”153
As social conservatives struggled to reign in urban youth, the Mann
Act became a popular prosecutorial tool—partly because it criminalized
men who transported women “for immoral purposes,” thereby obviating
the question of whether those women might have actually wanted to
travel.154 Further, the law’s invocation of liberty helped it transcend
fundamental problems with legal moralism, including the question of what,
147
See, e.g., ERIK LARSON, THE DEVIL IN THE WHITE CITY: MURDER, MAGIC, AND MADNESS AT
FAIR THAT CHANGED AMERICA 6 (2003) (discussing the many women who went missing during
the World’s Fair and were then found murdered).
148
See LANGUM, supra note 9, at 28–30 (describing the outpouring of public sympathy for young
immigrant women involved in prostitution).
149
Id. at 18.
150
See id. at 18, 27, 40 (retelling popular white slavery narratives of the time and linking those to
James Mann’s decision to sponsor the White Slave Traffic Act).
151
To be clear, scholars have discussed the white slave traffic scare as a discursive episode
“which acted as a condenser of anxieties about shifting race, sex, and gender relations.” Cecily
Devereux, “The Maiden Tribute” and the Rise of the White Slave in the Nineteenth Century: The
Making of an Imperial Construct, 26 VICTORIAN REV. 1, 3 (2000). See generally BRIAN DONOVAN,
WHITE SLAVE CRUSADES: RACE, GENDER, AND ANTI-VICE ACTIVISM, 1887–1917, at 5–6 (2006)
(emphasizing the law’s role in constructing racial categories); FREDERICK K. GRITTNER, WHITE
SLAVERY: MYTH, IDEOLOGY, AND AMERICAN LAW 3–4 (1990) (examining the interaction between
myth and law concerning the issue of white slavery); LANGUM, supra note 9, at 3–4 (underscoring the
political motivations behind the act).
152
See Deals in White Slaves: Philadelphia Syndicate Has Branches in Europe, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Nov. 21, 1902, at 4 (telling the story of one hundred girls who were “[sold] into lives of shame”
to more than twenty houses).
153
LANGUM, supra note 9, at 121.
154
Dubler, supra note 121, at 793.
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precisely, constituted an immoral purpose. As legal historian Ariela
Dubler has demonstrated, the Mann Act did not reflect shared morals so
much as it provided prosecutors with a tool for delineating what precisely
constituted “licit and illicit sexual expression.”155 Initially defined as
anything outside of marriage, prosecutors gradually began to look within
marriage as well, particularly after prostitutes began to employ the
“marriage cure” by betrothing their pimps.156 Given natural disagreements
over morality, the Mann Act benefited substantially from its association
with anti-slavery rhetoric, which all parties endorsed. Consequently,
“[b]etween the end of Prohibition and the mid-1940s,” notes historian
David Langum, “the Mann Act vied for second place in federal
convictions,” only “trailing behind interstate transportation of stolen
vehicles.”157
Then, abruptly, things changed. The Act began to lose support in the
late 1940s and early 1950s, partly due to a shift in attitudes toward private
sexual behavior on the part of American elites, and partly due to evolving
attitudes about race that made appeals to ending “white slavery” politically
gauche.158 For example, the Supreme Court indicated as early as 1938 that
the federal government might be constitutionally authorized to protect civil
rights abuses against African Americans in southern states.159 President
Harry Truman redoubled these efforts following World War II, establishing
a committee to investigate civil rights abuses in 1946.160 Finally, in 1986,
Congress deleted any mention of whiteness from the law.161
Though slavery’s color fell from view, support for regulating
prostitution did not—as evidenced by a spike in concern over trafficking in
the 1990s. For example, not long after Congress deleted “White Slave
Traffic” from the Mann Act, President Clinton outlined a three part
strategy to address the “prosecution of trafficking, prevention of
trafficking, and protection of trafficked persons—to guide U.S. anti155

Id. at 759, 766–67.
Id. at 765.
157
LANGUM, supra note 9, at 168.
158
Id. at 219. Though popular during the Progressive Era, the Mann Act suffered a decline in
support over the course of the twentieth century. Yet, the statute lived on. Id. In 1978, for example,
Congress amended the law to better define “immoral purpose,” including an explicit reference to “sadomasochistic abuse.” Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95225, § 3, 92 Stat. 7, 9 (1978). In 1986, however, Congress jettisoned such terms, limiting the offense to
anyone who transported an individual across state lines for the purpose of engaging in “any sexual
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense,” including trafficking. Child Sex
Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5(a)(2), 100 Stat. 3510, 3511 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012)).
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Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 342 (1938).
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DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 586–89 (1992).
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Congress substituted “Transportation for Illegal Sexual Activity and Related Crimes” for
“White Slave Traffic.” § 5(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3511.
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trafficking initiatives at home and abroad.”
Clinton’s move followed in
the steps of an international initiative against trafficking that dated to 1949
when a host of nations approved the first United Nations Convention for
the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others—thereby entering a treaty that invoked the rhetoric
of trafficking to target international and domestic prostitution.163 Article 1
of the Convention required signatories to “punish any person” who
“[p]rocures, entices, or leads away,” any woman for “purposes of
prostitution.”164 The law demonstrated how rationales that had once
animated the Mann Act survived, this time in the guise of trafficking.165
Though liberal efforts to deregulate vice in the 1960s and 1970s
dampened trafficking reform, that interest returned in the 1980s when
moral conservatives seized on the rhetoric of trafficking to revive interest
in abolishing prostitution, a move that carried into the 1990s when
President Clinton led negotiations over a new United Nations Trafficking
Protocol in 1998.166 That December, the United Nations General
Assembly passed a resolution establishing an “intergovernmental ad hoc
committee” to discuss proposals for quelling international “trafficking in
women and children.”167 Subsequently, the Committee met in Austria in
1999 to consider draft proposals from member states, including a draft
protocol to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime that
included a provision on trafficking.168 One year later, the Committee
approved a final draft and sent it to the General Assembly for approval.169
In a symbolic move, the Assembly agreed to meet in Palermo, Sicily—“the
epicenter of the old Italian Mafia”—to sign the final document.170
All 117 signatories of the Treaty agreed to make “trafficking in
persons” a criminal offense.171 To avoid delay, Congress drafted the
162
Chuang, supra note 12, at 1661 (quoting Memorandum on Steps to Combat Violence Against
Women and Trafficking in Women and Girls, 1 Pub. Papers 358 (Mar. 11, 1998)).
163
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, approved Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 273.
164
Id. art. 1.
165
See id. pmbl. (using moral rhetoric to denounce traffic in persons as “incompatible with the
dignity and worth of the human person”).
166
See Chuang, supra note 12, at 1666–67; Martti Lehti & Kauko Aromaa, Trafficking for Sexual
Exploitation, 34 CRIME & JUST. 134, 140 (2006) (arguing for the importance of focusing antitrafficking efforts on the largest source countries).
167
G.A. Res. 53/111, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/111, at 3 (Jan. 20, 1999); Gen. Assembly Ad
Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of a Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Draft
Elements for an Agreement on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of International
Trafficking in Women and Children, Supplementary to the Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime: Submitted by Argentina, U.N. Doc. A/AC.254/8 (Jan. 15, 1999).
168
Loftus, supra note 12, at 154.
169
Id. at 155.
170
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Id.
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Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, or TVPA, authorizing
the federal government to prosecute those who traffic in people for labor or
sex in violation of the treaty.172 Ironically, even as conservatives derided
the introduction of foreign law to the United States, few protested
America’s participation in the U.N. protocol on trafficking.173 In fact,
political interest in trafficking rose dramatically in the United States,
leading not only to federal involvement in enforcement but also to
unprecedented amounts of public and private funds for anti-trafficking
initiatives, despite questionable evidence that rates of trafficking had
actually risen.174
Part of the reason for this surge was the manner in which social
conservatives found the rhetoric of trafficking and anti-slavery useful for
regulating prostitution.175 For example, President George W. Bush
declared in 2002 that trafficking was a “modern day form of slavery” that
warranted abolition precisely because it was linked to prostitution.176
“[T]he United States Government,” declared Bush, “opposes prostitution
and any related activities, including pimping, pandering, or maintaining
brothels as contributing to the phenomenon of trafficking in persons.”177
Subsequently, neo-abolitionists attempted to federalize the criminalization
of prostitution by introducing a bill that would have made any one who
“persuades, induces, or entices” someone “to engage in prostitution” guilty
of trafficking.178 Though the bill failed,179 it marked an increasingly
aggressive effort to enlist the federal government’s anti-trafficking laws in
the cause of closing the brothels.
Few venues showcase the rhetorical power of trafficking—and antislavery—better than the Western District of Missouri. Located far from
any international border or port, the district still managed to become a
leader in trafficking prosecutions during the first decade of the twenty-first
century due to the “innovative techniques” of its prosecutors.180 In 2009,
172

Id. at 157–58.
See id. at 159 (“The House passed the bill by voice vote . . . and the Senate passed it with
unanimous consent.”).
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See Hinman, supra note 16 (reporting that millions of dollars have been spent to address forced
child prostitution while only ten percent of child prostitutes are involved with pimps).
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See Chuang, supra note 12, at 1680 (noting that “[t]he end of the Clinton Administration
brought an opportunity for the neo-abolitionists to recalibrate U.S. anti-trafficking policy” and by
extension, prostitution regulation).
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Id. (citing National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-22, at 2–3 (Dec. 16, 2002), available
at http://www.combat-trafficking.army.mil/documents/policy/nspd-22.pdf).
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Id. at 1692 (citing William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2007, H.R. 3887, 110th Cong. § 2430).
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Id.
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EAGLE (Aug. 30, 2011), www.kansas.com/2011/08/30/1995200/prosecutor-shares-tactics-for.html.
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for example, Cynthia Cordes became the first federal prosecutor to
“successfully prosecute customers of the sex trade under anti-sextrafficking laws” by setting up elaborate stings.181 One year later, the
office became the first in the nation to charge men who paid for sex,
namely Cook, Henry, Noel, and Stokes, as conspirators in trafficking.182
Their subsequent conviction183 underscores the successful manner in which
the rhetoric of trafficking—and slavery—enabled federal authorities to
expand the criminal sanction.
Though long criticized for undermining morals and causing harm,
prostitution has also been heavily associated with the rhetoric of slavery, as
this Part has shown. Importantly, this rhetoric is best viewed as separate
from either legal moralism or harm—a rhetorical slogan that has been
invoked precisely because it transcends questions of morality and damage.
As we have seen, anti-prostitution activists in the nineteenth century settled
on the notion of white slavery in order to rise above a cacophony of
arguments rooted in utilitarian and moralist theories surrounding sex work.
The utility of this rhetoric continued quietly through the twentieth century,
exploding in the 1990s when anti-prostitution activists, or neoabolitionists, turned to the rhetoric of trafficking as a means of stirring
bipartisan support for intensifying the regulation of prostitution.184
The next Part will look more closely at the rhetoric of anti-slavery,
entertaining the possibility that in addition to being a discursive device, it
might also lead to a substantive principle upon which the penal sanction
might rest—independent of moralism or harm. The articulation of such a
principle raises a variety of questions, including the possibility that
H. L. A. Hart interpreted J.S. Mill strategically, intentionally truncating his
theory of liberty to lessen the criminal sanction. Support for such a
position can be found, as we shall see, by comparing Hart’s principle to
Mill’s own discussions of freedom and, even more importantly, slavery.
But first, a few words on the relationship between legal moralism, harm,
and Bagley’s case.
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM
According to most criminal law scholars, debates over punishing
certain types of conduct have tended to focus on claims rooted in either
morality or harm.185 While claims rooted in morality tend to be considered
181
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“old-fashioned,” claims rooted in harm have “turned out to have little
practical bite,”186 leading scholars like Bernard Harcourt to conclude that a
new rhetorical “structure will surely emerge.”187 While the last Part
posited that such a structure involves the rhetoric of slavery and freedom,
more than simple rhetoric might be at work. As this Part will demonstrate,
J.S. Mill articulated an over-arching theory of liberty, or freedom, that bore
mixed implications for the criminal sanction,188 at times justifying a greater
role for punishment than mid-century liberals like H. L. A. Hart
acknowledged.189
To illustrate, consider BDSM. According to most accounts, Americans
are increasingly indifferent to the bedroom exploits of private couples,
even couples like Ed and Nicole who engage in extreme forms of BDSM
play.190 This is perhaps more true now than ever before due to the
overwhelming popularity of E.L. James’s 2012 novel Fifty Shades of Grey,
a best-selling romance that describes a relationship akin to the one shared
by Ed and Nicole.191 Boasting more than ten million copies sold in its first
six weeks on American shelves,192 the book recounts the story of a twentytwo year old protagonist named Anastasia Steele who is asked by an older
man, Christian Grey, to enter into a written contract substantially
restricting her freedom, including her ability to speak about their
relationship as well as her conduct within the relationship—which involves
BDSM play.193
To legal theorist Katie Roiphe, the popularity of Fifty Shades of Grey
reflects a larger “cultural interest” in “sexual domination,” reflected not
just in James’s novel, but also in films like A Dangerous Method about the
early relationship between Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, as well as studies
in Psychology Today and findings reported in popular journalist Daniel

MATERIALS 143 (9th ed. 2012) (noting the wide acceptance of Mill’s harm principle); JOHN KAPLAN ET
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 146–47 (2012) (describing the debate on the role that
harm and morality play “in the shaping of criminal law”).
186
KADISH ET AL., supra note 185, at 143.
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According to H. L. A. Hart, “legal moralism” comprises “the view that the enforcement of
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See Julie Bosman, 10 Million Shades of Green for an Erotic Trilogy, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2012, at C3 (using the success of E.L. James’s trilogy as evidence that people are indifferent to
“BDSM”); Nicole Sperling, COMIC-CON; E.L. James Feels the Love from ‘Grey’ Fans; One Credits
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Bergner’s 2009 New York Times article “What Do Women Want?”194
Roiphe argues that such sources suggest, in part, that precisely because
American women are “less dependent or subjugated” than ever before,
“theatrical fantasies of sexual surrender” have become objects of casual
interest, akin to a “vacation” or “an escape from the dreariness” of daily
life.195
That average Americans might view BDSM practice as a “vacation,”
could explain why the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Missouri
ultimately decided not to pursue a trafficking charge against Ed Bagley, a
real-life version of Christian Grey. Such a position would actually
coincide with prevailing constitutional frames regarding private sexual
activity. As recently as 2003, for example, the Supreme Court declared
that the Constitution did not brook the regulation of consensual sexual
behavior between adults simply for moral reasons, thereby delivering what
legal theorist Bernard Harcourt has termed a “coup de grâce to legal
moralism.”196 The case, Lawrence v. Texas,197 invalidated a sodomy law
that had been invoked against a same-sex couple in Houston, marking a
dramatic deregulation of same-sex relationships, not to mention all manner
of other relationships that local majorities might term illicit.198 To those

194
Katie Roiphe, She Works Crazy Hours. She Takes Care of the Kids. She Earns More Money.
She Manages Her Team. At the End of the Day, She Wants to be . . . Spanked?: Katie Roiphe on the
Curious Case of the Modern Woman’s Retro Bedroom Fantasy, NEWSWEEK, April 30, 2012, at 24.
Not all reaction to the book was positive. Libraries in places as disparate as Maryland, Florida,
Georgia, and Wisconsin refused to carry the book, while evangelical critics voiced their opposition to
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destruction.” SELENA SARNS, 50 SHADES OF BLACK AND WHITE: A BIBLICAL RESPONSE TO 50 SHADES
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Shades of Grey—Should We Read It?, CHANGING FACE CHRISTIANITY (Sept. 1, 2013),
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morally-minded majorities, the Court sent a clear message, noting “the fact
that the governing majority in a state has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral, is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice.”199 This, the Court maintained, was particularly
true in cases where the sexual behavior in question was practiced between
consenting adults in the privacy of their own home.200
Though focused on same-sex relationships, Lawrence carried with it
broader implications for those involved in other “illicit” behaviors, like
BDSM.201 For example, many state sodomy laws prohibited anal and oral
sex between opposite-sex partners, both commonly incorporated into
BDSM play.202 Lawrence’s declaration that such activities enjoyed
protection under the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment
transported a considerable amount of historically illicit behavior across
what legal historian, Ariela Dubler, has termed the “illicit/licit divide,”
making it impossible to regulate couples like Ed and Nicole on strictly
moral grounds.203 While Dubler focuses on the relationship between the
illicit/licit divide and marriage—highlighting the fact that the Supreme
Court has yet to extend the right to marry to same-sex couples—her point
underscores the larger fact that what is and is not illicit remains culturally
contingent. While some believe that the decriminalization of gay sex
paved the way for the legalization of gay marriage, others disagree, arguing
instead that the Supreme Court decriminalized gay sex precisely to prevent
the legalization of gay marriage.204 Justice Antonin Scalia articulated the
latter view in his Lawrence dissent, framing the struggle over the illicit/licit
divide in terms not of constitutional interpretation but cultural war.205 “It is
clear from this [decision] that the Court has taken sides in the culture war,”
REV. 75, 86 n.46 (registering surprise that Scalia did not mention S/M as one of the “parades of
horribles” that Lawrence might have deregulated).
199
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200
Id. at 571.
201
Professor Mary Anne Case argues that Lawrence did more than simply deregulate same-sex
relationships. See Case, supra note 198, at 78 (clarifying that Lawrence did not target anal sex in
particular). For an analysis of “illicit” versus “licit” categories, see Dubler, supra note 121.
202
The Supreme Court upheld one such law in 1986, over a decade before Lawrence. See
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (finding a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy regardless of sexual
orientation to be constitutional). To the extent that BDSM practice might include oral or anal sex, such
activities would fall under traditional sodomy statutes. Other BDSM practices, however, remain
unregulated. See Mary Anne Case, Commentary, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A
Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1684
(1993) (suggesting that some BDSM conduct is not generally criminalized by sodomy statutes due to
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203
See Dubler, supra note 121, at 812 (claiming Lawrence moved sexual behavior across the
illicit/licit divide without regard to the marital status of the couple).
204
E.g., Dubler, supra note 121, at 809–10.
205
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

592

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:561

lamented Scalia, “departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer,
that the democratic rules of engagement are observed.”206 Though vague
on how precisely the Court might remain a “neutral observer” in liberty
interest cases, Scalia’s dissent highlights the oft-obscured fact that the
illicit/licit divide is itself a political battle line—a contested front in what
Bernard Harcourt has termed “a war of sexual projects that is being fought
on American soil.”207
Ed and Nicole’s place in those projects is worth contemplating, if for
no other reason than to better discern how, precisely, the rhetoric of antislavery might have served either as a separate or over-arching legal
principle sanctioning convictions in the case. For example, just as there are
problems with the notion of rooting BDSM prosecutions in notions of
morality, so too are there problems with framing cases like Ed and Nicole’s
in terms of harm.208 After all, the very premise of BDSM culture is the
notion that the application of pain can yield heightened levels of
pleasure.209 Hence, the government’s effort to frame Ed and Nicole’s
BDSM play as torture and abuse fails to capture the cultural context, and
subjective appeal, of such behavior.210 Further, the government’s decision
to convict Bagley of sleeping with, but not trafficking, Nicole points to
doubts it may itself have had regarding its evidence.211 While some might
contend that Bagley’s years of grooming and his assiduous attention to age
limits and consent agreements amounted to a subtle, gradual process of
coercion—not to mention popular perceptions of BDSM as a type of
“vacation”—it may have dissuaded the government from taking his case to
trial.212 Ironically, this might explain why defendants who only played a
marginal role in the case confessed more easily to trafficking than Ed: they
were less cognizant of the full scope and complexity of the law of
206

Id. at 602.
Harcourt, supra note 196, at 506.
208
Here too, Lawrence might pose problems. While it is certainly possible that the U.S. Attorney
felt that Bagley harmed Nicole, Lawrence acts like a defensive bulwark in this particular sexual project,
discouraging efforts to invoke harm as a justification for regulating consensual BDSM practice.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602–04.
209
MILLER & DEVON, supra note 38, at 4, 9–11 (explaining that in BDSM culture, receiving pain
in the context of domination, bondage, corporal punishment, and flagellation between consenting adults
elicits pleasure and eroticism).
210
Of course, the government may have felt that Nicole never consented to her relationship with
Bagley, particularly given the young age at which she began to be groomed. Yet, the U.S. Attorney
never charged Bagley with trafficking a minor, even though he did end up pleading guilty to using the
Internet to facilitate sex with a minor. Put differently, the possibility that Bagley might have trafficked
Nicole by taking advantage of her young age is a possibility that not even the government was willing
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U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).
212
Bagley’s slave contract might have been an effort to record Nicole’s consent to their BDSM
activities.
207

2013]

STRANGE TRAFFIC

593

trafficking, not to mention the counter-cultural norms of BDSM.
Lawrence might also have played a role. Since Lawrence, mutually
consensual sexual behavior between adults has enjoyed constitutional
protection—even if it causes alleged harm. For example, the Court in
Lawrence ignored claims that sodomy threatened the spread of sexually
transmitted disease, holding instead that the Fourteenth Amendment
broadly protected private consensual behavior.213 Hence, harm proved
To
relatively useless as a rhetorical tool—ditto for moralism.214
compensate for this, the Supreme Court focused heavily on consent in
Lawrence, arguably using it as a substitute for arbitrary measurements of
damage.215
With consent comes freedom.216 Given the challenges that BDSM
practice poses to questions of harm, it remains possible that trafficking
provided the government with an opportunity to seize on the currency of
liberty as a frame for prosecuting a variety of players in a complex, morally
obtuse drama. As we have seen, trafficking offers rhetorical possibilities
that other criminal penalties do not, possibilities that may even render it a
powerful weapon against the Supreme Court’s firewall surrounding
intimate conduct in Lawrence. Even as Lawrence hinges on the arguably
popular notion that the Constitution protects a liberty interest in private
sexual conduct,217 trafficking bounds that conduct by invoking the specter
of coercion. Closely tied to coercion, of course, is the rhetoric of slavery,
anti-slavery, and freedom, all cultural frames that engender considerable
popular support, marshal considerable regulatory potential, and seem to fit
nicely with Bagley’s case.218
While Ed can claim that Nicole engaged willingly in her own
enslavement, jurors might find it repugnant that he asked her to sign a
formal slave contract, a violation of the spirit of liberty more profound than
either legal moralism or harm. Indeed, the idea that one might sign away
one’s freedom seems to defy the very purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, an amendment forged in the aftermath of a bloody civil war
213
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dedicated to eradicating human bondage.
Further, the notion that one
might surrender one’s liberty also falls askance of the political theory
espoused by John Stuart Mill.220
In the same essay that he articulated his famous harm principle, Mill
also warned that one should not be able to “sell himself, or allow himself to
be sold, as a slave,” arguing that it violates the “principle of freedom.”221
This principle, argued Mill, overrides personal choice. Even if one finds it
desirable to be a slave, the state should not allow individuals to sacrifice
their freedom, because “[t]he principle of freedom cannot require that [one]
should be free not to be free.”222 Granted, Nicole’s slave contract bore no
legal validity. However, the argument could be made that as a matter of
principle, efforts to recreate chattel slavery through D/s practice
approaches something like a common law marriage, an informal
relationship in which individuals hold themselves out to be married—or in
this case enslaved—thereby defying the principle of freedom.
To criminal law scholar Joel Feinberg, Mill’s “principle of freedom” is
simply another facet of the harm principle, an appeal “not to a sovereign
right to ‘dispose of one’s own lot in life’ but to a person’s own good.”223
Yet, this might be an incomplete inflation of harm’s importance within
Mill’s larger theory of freedom or liberty. For example, legal scholar
Vincent Blasi demonstrates that Mill granted “extraordinary protection” to
the freedom of expression, even in cases where “severe harms” were at
stake.224 This move stemmed from a larger conviction that questions of
“utility” should remain subordinate to the development of individuals as
“progressive being[s],” even if it meant opposing custom, conformity, and
religion.225 One of Mill’s problems with “Calvinistic theory,” for example,
was that it placed “obedience” above freedom.226 Rather than encourage
obedience, Mill believed that law should foster “the cultivation of
individuality.”227 “[I]t is only the cultivation of individuality,” argued Mill,

219
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JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 62 (1998).
220
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“which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings.”
Mill’s doubts about religion and his interest in developing individuality
are worth noting, precisely because they point to a rationale for legal
intervention in private matters otherwise downplayed by criminal law
scholars.229 In his famous “pared down” version of Mill’s theory, for
example, H. L. A. Hart deliberately occluded any mention of the
development of individuality, focusing instead on a “simple and succinct
statement” about harm, noting that “[t]he only purpose for which power
can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community
against his will is to prevent harm to others.”230 This move, argues Bernard
Harcourt, “structured the debate over the legal enforcement of morality”
for the remainder of the twentieth century, pitting legal moralism against
harm.231
That Hart deliberately truncated Mill is not something criminal law
scholars have considered, though its implications are potentially profound.
For example, Mill enumerated a variety of scenarios where power could be
“rightfully” “exercised” over individuals “against [their] will” that
arguably did not involve preventing harm.232 For example, he sanctioned
the use of unfettered power against “children,” “young persons,” and
anyone who was too “backward” to be improved by “free and equal
discussion.”233 Mill also declared it a “self-evident axiom” that the state
should “compel” parents to educate their children “up to a certain
standard.”234 If they failed, he maintained, they should be punished;
subjected to “a moderate fine” determined by whether or not their children
passed “public examinations.”235
Mill’s support for punishing parents who did not adequately educate
their children stemmed not simply from his conviction that the law should
prevent harm, but a larger conviction that the law should be used to
engender a particular type of person: a creative, free-thinking individual, or
what Mill termed a “genius.”236 While Mill recognized that not all persons
could achieve genius status, he placed the cultivation of such figures at a
premium, arguably even above the interests of majoritarian democracy.237
“Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a
228
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For a more in-depth discussion of Mill’s theory of development, see Russell Hittinger, The
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reproach,” argued Mill, “it is desirable, in order to break through that
tyranny” that government should foster individuality, “eccentricity,” and
“genius.”238 The way to do this, argued Mill, was to guarantee a certain
degree of personal freedom, for “[g]enius can only breathe freely in an
atmosphere of freedom.”239
Yet, that freedom was itself bounded by the larger goal of developing
individuality, not conformity. Even if the majority of people longed for
“the despotism of custom,” or the “mediocrity” of religion, argued Mill,
society’s proper posture, according to him, was the encouragement of
unique, creative individuals with exemplary talents—even if it meant
forcing parents to educate their children in a certain way.240 “I insist thus
emphatically on the importance of genius,” noted Mill, continuing that
“[t]he initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come from
individuals; generally at first from some one individual.”241
Because he prized individual genius above community norms, Mill
endorsed a variety of regulations that may or may not have had anything to
do with harm. This explains why he called for mandatory education and
for penalties against parents who did not sufficiently train their children.242
It also explains why he refused to extend legal protection to entire
populations of what he termed “backward” people and “barbarians” who
could not be improved by “free and equal discussion.”243 Such measures,
argued Mill, made the development of genius among a select few more
likely, even if it left groups considered “backward” unprotected.244
Committed to fostering personal creativity, Mill endorsed state
measures that intruded more heavily into private life than criminal law
theorists like H. L. A. Hart have let on. Indeed, Mill himself never actually
invoked the term “harm principle,” referring instead to the “principle of
freedom” or “liberty” as his animating principle of regulation.245
Acknowledging this is important. While the invocation of harm lends itself
to diminishing the criminal sanction, to dismantling legal moralism, and so
on, the celebration of individuality, eccentricity, and “genius” invites a
more ambiguous regulatory agenda, one that H. L. A. Hart chose not to
expound.246 In fact, one might say that the principle of freedom introduces
a new basis for justifying and expanding the criminal sanction.247
238
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To take just a few examples, the principle of freedom might be invoked
as a rationale for those who try to recreate chattel slavery, not just
individuals like Ed Bagley but those who participate in even more
elaborate D/s practices, like paying money for slaves—such as Master
Mark.248 The freedom principle might also be invoked to criminalize the
distribution—but not necessarily the possession—of certain drugs on the
theory that those who knowingly profit from addiction are responsible for
spreading a form of slavery, or un-freedom.249 As Mill himself noted, the
“interest” of “dealers in promoting intemperance” rather than just imbibers
“is a real evil and justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring
guarantees which, but for that justification, would be infringements of
legitimate liberty.”250 Further, the freedom principle might be invoked to
regulate purveyors of other types of vice, like prostitution, a point that Mill
raised by acknowledging that while fornication “must be tolerated” the
same did not necessarily apply to whether “a person [should] be free to be
a pimp.”251
Political philosophers have proven more open to exploring the
implications of Mill’s concept of freedom than criminal law theorists.
Compare, for example, H. L. A. Hart’s exclusive emphasis on harm to
Gerald Dworkin’s argument that Mill envisioned the use of state power “to
heighten a person’s ability to lead a rationally ordered life,” a point that
coincides with the development of individuality, creativity, and genius.252
In a manner that suggests the plausible existence of a distinct principle of
freedom, Dworkin also endorsed the idea that Mill would have sanctioned
government intervention in private life out of “a concern not just for the
happiness or welfare, in some broad sense, of the individual but rather a
concern for the autonomy and freedom of the person.”253 Though criminal
law scholars like Joel Feinberg have tended to resist such “freedom
maximization” arguments by attempting to roll them into calculations of
harm,254 even Feinberg concedes that freedom and harm do not necessarily
would be slaves, and thereby limiting a slave’s ability to contract, protects and does not interfere with
the slave’s liberty).
248
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coincide, noting that one might have “a powerful psychological”
imperative to willingly impose harm upon oneself, either out of “atonement
for some sin,” “the achievement of perfect self-discipline through a kind of
self-abasement,” or “a religious need to achieve genuine humility through
the lowliest status he can acquire.”255 “Voluntary enslavement for some of
these reasons,” continues Feinberg, “seems no crazier than the solitary
forms of holy asceticism, like choosing the life of an anchorite in the
desert, wearing sackcloth and ashes, and mortifying the flesh.”256
V. CONCLUSION
The prosecution of Ed Bagley and four other defendants in rural
Missouri for sex slavery points to new, even strange directions for the law
of trafficking.257 To begin, Bagley’s D/s relationship, with FV/Nicole
complicated the case precisely because it hinged on acts unique to BDSM
subculture. However, the government deliberately decontextualized such
acts in its indictment, arguably misrepresenting Ed’s treatment of Nicole as
a matter of simple abuse. Further, the government decontextualized Ed
and Nicole’s “slave contract,” using it to reinforce its claim of trafficking,
along with Nicole’s barcode tattoo.
While the government could have argued that a subtle form of coercion
underlay Ed’s activities, the Western District of Missouri pursued a
different path, accepting a non-trafficking related plea from Ed.258
Meanwhile the government convicted the remaining defendants of
conspiracy to traffic—an odd asymmetry given that they had much less
contact with Nicole.259 Part I concludes that the government’s case against
Ed ultimately proved less important than its pursuit of marginal defendants
who paid for sex with Nicole, pointing to a new role for the law of
trafficking—the regulation of men who pay for sex.
Part II expands on the relationship between trafficking and prostitution
to make a larger point, namely that trafficking invites creative use precisely
because it provides prosecutors with a more salient justification for
punishment than either legal moralism or harm; a rhetorical plea to antislavery that enjoys a longstanding but under-theorized role in criminal law
rhetoric. According to criminal law scholar Bernard Harcourt, criminal
255
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law rhetoric is rooted in a fairly straightforward dichotomy between
morality and harm.260 While most criminal law theorists agree with this
postulate,261 Bagley’s case indicates that a third trope is also operative:
freedom.
Part III demonstrates that freedom/anti-slavery rhetoric has long played
a role in American criminal law, dating at least as far back as the Mann Act
of 1910. Initially styled the White Slave Traffic Act, the law emerged
during a time in American history when reformers sought desperately to
control prostitution, immigration, and eroding rural values. When it came
to such projects, neither appeals to morality nor harm proved as salient as
invocations of slavery, pointing to a longstanding, if lost, pillar of legal
rhetoric, a counter to legal moralism and harm rooted in Mill’s notion of
liberty. Recovering the rhetorical role of freedom in the criminal law
context is the most significant contribution of this piece.
Part IV engages the doctrinal implications of freedom as a principle,
asking whether anti-slavery’s recurrence in criminal law discourse might
be more than simply rhetorical; a possible free-standing principle upon
which to rest criminal punishment—one deliberately submerged by
H. L. A. Hart in the 1960s. While most criminal law scholars merge Mill’s
thoughts on freedom and liberty with his mention of harm, Mill himself
espoused an interest in using state power to encourage creativity,
individuality, and “genius,” all regulatory agendas potentially more
complicated than H. L. A. Hart’s “pared” down emphasis on damage.262
Perhaps no better example of this exists than Mill’s own assertion that
selling oneself into slavery violates the “principle of freedom.”263 Even
criminal law scholars like Joel Feinberg concede that regulating such
choices might actually have little to do with the analytics of harm.264 Even
if H. L. A. Hart is not wrong on Mill, he encouraged an overly narrow
interpretation of his work.
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